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This paper considers the decisions of workers to search in diﬀerent la-
bor markets. In the basic model, a worker can search in one labor market
or another but not both. With non-pecuniary beneﬁts, a worker chooses
the labor market oﬀering the highest reservation utility level. Conditions
for simultaneous search in two markets are also derived under the assump-
tion that workers suﬀer a reduction in wage oﬀers. Decisions of where to
search are relevant to self-selection into sectors and self-selection biases, the
f o r m a t i o no fi n t e r v i e wn e t w o r k s ,a n dg e n e r a t i o no fo v e r l a p p i n gm a r k e t s .
1. Introduction
This paper examines a worker’s decision of where to search. A worker can search
in one labor market or another labor market, or in both. The model extends
search theory by introducing a prior sectoral choice of where to search, instead of
having all workers in an aggregate labor market searching in a common market.
The decision of where to search could result in the worker ending up in either of
two types of jobs (or occupations), or moving back and forth between two types
of jobs.
∗This paper has been prepared for the session on “Search in Labor and Marriage Markets,”
Econometric Society Winter Meetings, January 6, 2002.A worker’s decision concerning where to search can play a signiﬁcant role in
the assignment of workers to jobs (see Sattinger, 1993, for a survey). In the model
developed by A.D. Roy (1951), workers choose sectors on the basis of income
maximization, leading to a self-selection assignment of workers to productive ac-
tivities. In the envelope model developed by Jan Tinbergen (1951), there are
continuous distributions of job and worker attributes. In the equilibrium, the
oﬀer curves of cost-minimizing employers form an envelope, and workers choose
the wage-attribute combination that maximizes their utilities. The Roy and Tin-
bergen models do not incorporate search. In search models, workers ﬁnd jobs by
considering job oﬀers sequentially (in most models), stopping when the wage oﬀer
exceeds a reservation wage determined optimally by the worker (Dale Mortensen
and Christopher Pissarides, 1999, provide a survey). With heterogeneous work-
ers and jobs, this can result in an assignment that diﬀers from frictionless exact
assignments (Sattinger, 1995). The paper presented here ﬁts into the assignment
literature by combining the sectoral choice approach with the search approach.
Prior to engaging in search, the worker decides in which labor market he or she
will search.
Sectoral search choice can play a signiﬁcant role in determining the structure
and operation of labor markets. In product markets with rationing (Denis Carlton,
1978, John Gould, 1978), buyers are assumed to choose where to seek a good
on the basis of a combination of price and likelihood of getting the good. The
ability of buyers to choose where to seek the good gives sellers price-setting ability,
since an increase in price reduces the number of buyers until the value of seeking
the good at that ﬁrm returns to its former level. In labor markets where ﬁrms
announce wages (known as wage posting) and workers can determine the likelihood
of getting a job, equilibrium wages eliminate search congestion (Sattinger, 1990).
With a continuum of labor markets diﬀering by ratio of unemployed workers to
vacancies, worker choice of labor markets yields complete markets and a return
to the envelope models of Tinbergen (Espen Moen, 1995; Shouyoung Shi, 2001;
Mortensen and Randall Wright, 2002). Robert Shimer (2001) has shown that
decisions of where to apply for a job (combined with ﬁrm decisions to oﬀer jobs)
determine the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with frictions. Worker
or buyer decisions analogous to sectoral search choice have therefore appeared
previously in various models.
To investigate a worker’s decision to search in one market versus another, a
search version of the Roy model is developed (Roy, 1951). As is well known, in the
simple Roy model, people choose between ﬁshing for trout or hunting for rabbits
2on the basis of income maximization. The Roy model provides a simple way of
looking at self-selection of occupations. There are no employers in the Roy model
and no wage oﬀers, so search would not seem to be a natural extension of the
model. However, it can be assumed that there is a distribution of nonpecuniary
beneﬁts associated with ﬁshing or hunting locations. James Heckman and Guil-
laume Sedlacek (1985) extend the Roy model to include nonpecuniary beneﬁts in
the form of occupational preferences but not in a search context. Sattinger (1996)
develops a search model in which workers consider both wage and nonpecuniary
beneﬁt. In the model developed here, a worker examines a particular site in a
search process (say, while looking for a ﬁshing spot) and determines the satisfac-
tion level associated with the site. Sites for trout ﬁshing can vary for a number
of reasons, such as view, sunshine, vegetation, slope of the bank, or overhanging
branches. It is assumed that these features do not aﬀect productivity, and that
no congestion for other ﬁshers occurs. Likewise, sites for hunting rabbits can vary.
In less bucolic workplaces, a number of features aﬀect worker satisfaction, such as
noise, heat, room, fresh air, and comfort. With variation in satisfaction, workers
no longer choose sectors simply on the basis of income maximization.
With a distribution of nonpecuniary beneﬁts, workers set a reservation level
of total beneﬁts that they could get from a given occupation. If workers could
only choose between the two occupations, they would choose the occupation that
yields the highest reservation level of total beneﬁts, since the reservation level also
measures the expected long run ﬂow of beneﬁts. In this way, choice of occupation
under search would parallel choice of occupation in the original Roy model, and
questions concerning the distribution of workers in each occupation could be con-
sidered as in the original Roy model and extensions. However, it is also possible
for workers to search in both markets, depending on the search technology. For
example, it is possible to assume that the number of sites workers could visit in
each of the occupations would be a proportion a of the number that could be
visited if only one occupation were considered. A worker would only consider
searching in both markets if doing so yields a higher reservation level of total
beneﬁts than concentrating in either of the two occupations. If some workers
search in both markets, then a simple form of overlapping markets arises. In the
“trout” market, some workers search for sites in the “rabbit” market, but some
do not. In the “rabbit” market, some workers search for trout sites, but some do
not. The two markets overlap for those workers searching in both markets. With
the Roy production technology, no externalities arise if the number of workers
choosing an occupation does not aﬀect the number of catches or the distribution
3of nonpecuniary beneﬁts available to other workers.
The next section develops the formal model, and section 3 discusses implica-
tions of the model for self-selection biases and overlapping markets.
2. Model
2.1. Conditions in Sectors
Suppose there are two sectors, indexed by j =1 ,2. Let xij be the output of person
i in sector j. For the purposes of this section, it will not be necessary to specify
the distribution of the xij values. Let pj be the price paid to a worker per unit
of output in sector j. T h ei n c o m eo fp e r s o ni in sector j would then be pjxij. Let
s be a particular satisfaction level, measured in monetary units, and let Gj(s) be
the cumulative distribution function of satisfaction levels in sector j. Let gj(s) be
the corresponding probability density function of satisfaction levels.
Let zijt be the utility level for person i from site t in sector j:
zijt = pjxijt + sijt (2.1)
where sijt is the satisfaction level from site t in sector j. Since pjxij does not vary
from site to site in sector j, selection of a reservation utility level is equivalent to
selection of a reservation satisfaction level in sector j. Let s0j be the reservation
satisfaction level if a worker is searching in sector j.
Suppose workers move into and out of employment. Let γ be the transition
rate from employment to unemployment. (For simplicity, γ will be assumed to be
the same in both sectors.) When unemployed, a worker could search in sector j
for sites at which to work. Let λj(s0j) be the transition rate from unemployment
to employment for a worker searching in sector j with reservation satisfaction
level s0j. Let θj be the rate at which a worker comes across sites in sector j, if the
worker is only looking in sector j. Then
λj(s0j)=θj(1 − Gj(s0j)) (2.2)
Now consider the determination of the reservation satisfaction level if the
worker only searches in sector j. In the Markov process describing the worker’s
movements between employment and unemployment, it is possible to specify the
asset values in the two states of employed and unemployed.1 If the worker chooses
1The following derivations are described in more detail in Sattinger (1985) for the standard
search problem in a Markov process.








where r is the discount rate, bj is the level of beneﬁts (if any) while unemployed,







The reservation satisfaction level s0j is chosen to maximize the ﬂow of asset value
rVij(s0j). By taking the derivative of rVij(s0j) with respect to s0j, it can be shown
that the optimal reservation satisfaction level s0j occurs when
pjxij + s0j = rVij(s0j) (2.5)
Setting pjxij +s0j equal to the right side of 2.3 and solving yields the reservation
value s0j.
2.2. Choice Between Sectors
Now suppose that the worker is constrained to choose one sector or the other
and has calculated the reservation satisfaction levels in each sector. The expected
utility levels in the two sectors are then p1xi1 + s01 and p2xi2 + s02. The worker
chooses the sector that yields the higher utility level. In particular, the worker
chooses sector 1 whenever p1xi1 + s01 >p 2xi2 + s02 or
s01 > (p2xi2 − p1xi1)+s02 (2.6)
That is, the reservation satisfaction level in the sector chosen must exceed the
diﬀerence in incomes plus the reservation satisfaction level in the other sector.
By substituting the optimal choices of s01 and s02 into the expressions for the
expected utility levels, it is possible to divide the (xi1,xi2) plane into two groups
of workers, one choosing sector 1 and the other choosing sector 2. By setting the
expected utility levels equal, it is possible to determine the dividing line between
the two sectors. This is done in Figure 2.1 using particular assumptions.2 Figure
2Figure 2.1 assumes that the distributions of satisfaction levels are given by the Pareto
functions g1(s)=g2(s)=2 s−3. The parameter values are b1 = .1,b 2 = .2,r= .1,γ= .05,
θ1 = θ2 =1 ,p 1 =1and p2 =2 .








Figure 2.1: Choice Between Sectors
2.2 assumes θ2 =4 , making sector 2 more attractive and yielding a diﬀerent
dividing line. Note that the dividing line is no longer a straight line as it is in the
standard Roy model.
2.3. Choice of Both Sectors
In this section, the worker is allowed a third choice: the worker can search in both
sectors. Let s01 and s02 again be the reservation satisfaction levels when looking
in sectors 1 and 2, respectively. Suppose there is some loss in the number of sites
searched in the two sectors as a result of going back and forth between the two
sectors. Let aλj(s0j) be the rate at which acceptable jobs are found in sector j,
where a<1. When the worker searches in both markets, the transition rate out of
unemployment is then aλ1(s01)+aλ2(s02). The worker now moves between three
states, employed in sector 1, employed in sector 2, and unemployed. Specifying
asset value functions for each state and solving yields an expression for the asset
value while unemployed, as a function of s01 and s02. The reservation satisfaction
levels s01 and s02 can be expressed as functions of a common reservation utility
level. Setting the common reservation utility level equal to the ﬂow of asset value
when unemployed and solving yields the common reservation utility level.
The worker chooses to search in both sectors if doing so yields a higher level
of expected utility then if the worker only searched in one of the other sectors.








Figure 2.2: Choice Between Sectors: Alternative Parameters
This occurs if the common reservation utility level exceeds the reservation utility
levels if the worker only searched in a single sector.3
It is not necessary to calculate the common reservation utility level to deter-
m i n ei faw o r k e rs h o u l ds e a r c hi nb o t hm a r k e t s . T a k i n gs01 and s02 from the
individual sector optimization problems, it is possible to calculate the resulting
ﬂow of asset values from searching in both markets. If this value exceeds the util-
ity values implied by s01 and s02 from searching in only one market, the worker
should search in both markets. If the value falls below the utility value for either
sector 1 or 2, the worker should search in only one sector; raising the common
reservation utility level will only lower the ﬂow of asset value from searching in
both markets.
The area of the (xi1,xi2) p l a n ei nw h i c hw o r k e r ss e a r c hi nb o t hm a r k e t si ss h o w n
in Figure 2.3 using most of the assumptions used in Figure 2.1.4 Workers are more
likely to search in both markets if their expected utilities in the two markets are
approximately the same. If the expected utility in one market is much greater
than in the other market, they are likely to concentrate their search in that one
market. (This would occur if a worker is much more productive in one sector.)
3That is, the common reservation utility level exceeds both p1xi1+s01 and p2xi2+s02, where
s01 and s02 are calculated assuming the worker only searches in sector 1 or 2, respectively.
4Figure 2.3 assumes a = .8 and b3 = .1










Figure 2.3: Search in Both Sectors
The shape of the relevant area depends on where the density of workers with
respect to xi1 and xi2 occurs. For example, if there is a uniform distribution in
the rectangle with xi1 f r o m0t o5a n dxi2 f r o m0t o2 ,m o s tw o r k e r sw i l ls e a r c hi n
both sectors except for workers in the upper left and lower right of the rectangle.
In these areas, performance in one sector is much greater than in the other sector.
If instead there is a uniform density with xi1 f r o m5t o2 0a n dxi2 from 2 to 10,
only a narrow strip of workers will search in both sectors.
In the analysis of the standard Roy model, sectoral choice is based on compar-
ative advantage: workers in one sectoral activity have a comparative advantage
at that activity compared to the workers in the other sector performing the other
activity. With workers forced to choose between two sectors, the presence of
satisfaction may lead to some workers (those with approximately equal incomes
from the two sectors) choosing sectors that do not accord with their comparative
advantage. Workers with substantial comparative advantage (with unequal po-
tential incomes from the two sectors) would continue to choose sectors based on
comparative advantage.
With the option of searching in both markets, workers with approximately
equal incomes in the two markets would choose to search in both markets. Those
choosing to search in only one sector are likely to have a comparative advantage
in that sector’s activity. Workers searching in both sectors would sometimes end
8up in one sector and sometimes in the other. Their times in the two sectors would
be related to their comparative advantage but some of the time they would be in
the sector where they do not have a comparative advantage.
The parameter a, reﬂecting the relative eﬃciency of searching in two markets,
aﬀects the number of workers choosing to search in two markets. With a larger
value of a, the time spent unemployed is smaller (for a given reservation common
utility level), the gain from searching in the two markets is greater, and the
reservation common utility level will be greater. The area of the (xi1,xi2) plane
searching in both markets will be greater.
3. Conclusions
This paper has outlined some of the determinants of the worker decision to search
in one market or another or in both markets. The basis of choice is the reservation
utility level from each alternative choice (which determines reservation satisfaction
levels). Dividing lines between sectors occur when the reservation utility levels
are equal. Workers are more likely to search in two markets simultaneously when
their incomes from the two markets are approximately equal.
Self-selection biases may be substantially reduced with sectoral search choice.
An important implication of the original Roy model was the presence of self-
selection biases, examined by Heckman in a number of papers. The distribution
of wages or earnings in a sector does not reﬂect the distribution of wages for the
population since workers with low earnings in that sector are likely to have chosen
the other sector. This occurs because the worker’s outcomes in the two sectors
(the productivity and income levels that the worker would receive in the two sec-
tors) are determined and known to the worker at the same time as the choice
of sectors. With sectoral search choice, this is no longer the case. The worker
chooses the sector (or both sectors) prior to knowing the outcome of search in
the two sectors. The worker choice is based on the distribution of all outcomes,
as determined by the distributions of satisfaction levels as considered here, rather
than the particular outcome that results from the search process. The distrib-
ution of satisfaction levels (or wage oﬀe r si nam o r eg e n e r a lm o d e l )i nas e c t o r
is then unaﬀected by the fact that the worker chose that sector. The distribu-
tion of satisfaction levels at accepted jobs for a worker will nevertheless depend
on the worker’s reservation utility level. If the worker’s reservation utility level
corresponds to a satisfaction level s∗, the distribution of satisfaction levels among
accepted jobs will be gj(s)/(1 − Gj(s∗),s≥ s∗. There will still exist selection
9biases since the reservation utility level will be determined simultaneously with
the choice of sector. Estimation procedures for sectoral search choice will dif-
fer both from the standard self-selection procedures and from the procedures for
estimating reservation wages in an aggregate search market.
The search version of the Roy model considered here does not incorporate
employer decisions or congestion externalities. Without further assumptions about
production in the two activities, it does not lend itself to questions concerning the
eﬃciency of assignment. However, it is possible to incorporate sectoral search
choice into an overlapping markets model (Sattinger, 2000).
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